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The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness sets targets for increased use by donors of recipient country systems for managing aid. The target is premised on a view that country systems are strengthened when donors trust recipients to manage aid funds, but undermined when donors manage aid through their own separate parallel systems. This study provides an analytical framework for understanding donors' decisions to trust or bypass country systems. Empirical tests are conducted using data from three OECD-DAC surveys designed to monitor progress toward Paris Declaration goals. This paper is a product of the Human Development and Public Services Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at sknack@worldbank.org.
Tests show that a donor's use of the recipient country's systems is positively related to: (1) the donor's share of aid provided to the recipient (a proxy for the donor's reputational stake in the country's development); (2) perceptions of corruption in the recipient country (a proxy for the trustworthiness or quality of the country's systems); and (3) public support for aid in the donor country (a proxy for the donor's risk tolerance). Findings are robust to corrections for potential sample selection, omitted variables or endogeneity bias.
Introduction
The literature on growth and development now recognizes a key role for the quality of public institutions. Yet, little is known about how to apply this insight constructively in the design of development assistance. "Good governance" in the form of capable and accountable state institutions emerged only over the course of centuries in the West, and it may be impossible for today"s developing countries to follow similar paths in a dramatically compressed time frame. Historically unprecedented progress on health outcomes and education enrollment may contribute to unrealistic expectations regarding donors" role in accelerating institutional development in poor countries. Even in relatively technocratic areas (e.g. civil service and legal/judicial reform) of public sector governance, success rates for donor projects are low and the evidence base underpinning the design of interventions is thin or absent (IEG, 2008) .
Moreover, there is growing recognition that international aid -and particular donor practices -can unintentionally weaken governance in recipient countries. Aid -like natural resource revenues -can encourage rent seeking and undermine government"s accountability to its own citizens, by reducing its dependence on domestic taxpayers for revenues (Moore, 1998; Collier, 2006; Knack, 2009) . Donors can also undermine government capacity, when they fragment their aid among too many projects, sectors and countries, and insist on delivering aid using their own reporting, procurement and other procedures (Brautigam and Knack, 2004) . As the World Bank"s Assessing Aid report acknowledges: "At times, donors have hindered the creation of effective public sectors because they saw end runs around local institutions as the easiest way to achieve project success" (World Bank, 1998: 84) .
These arguments have attained the status of conventional wisdom within the international aid community. The importance of delivering aid in ways consistent with long-run institutional strengthening is a major theme in the Paris Declaration agenda for reforming aid practices. The Paris Declaration (PD) created a set of numerical indicators on improved "alignment" of aid activities with country systems and inter-donor coordination, to be monitored through surveys of donors and recipient countries, with defined targets for the year 2010.
Although the PD principles and associated indicators reflect a broad consensus within the donor community (most notably in the OECD Development Assistance Committee), the empirical basis for this new aid effectiveness agenda is thin (Easterly, 2007) . Advocacy for reform of donor practices is based on theory, intuition and scattered anecdotal evidence.
1 This paper does not attempt to add to the thin evidence base underpinning the Paris Declaration principles and indicators. Rather, it is premised on the fact that they have been endorsed by the DAC bilateral donors and multilateral agencies providing the bulk of ODA, and by most recipient countries. Donor behavior is assessed relative to donors" own assertions about what constitutes more effective aid practices.
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Knack and Eubank (2009) provide a theoretical framework for understanding the incentive problems among donors that can produce suboptimal levels of harmonization and alignment in their aid activities. This framework and supporting empirical evidence are relevant so long as most of the donor community believes that use of country systems is currently below the optimal level. The caveat is that we cannot offer confident conclusions about which donors 1 See World Bank (2003: ch. 11) for representative anecdotes. Azam et al. (1999) construct a formal model with learning-by-doing externalities in tax administration, in which aid dependence with low institutional capacity can be an equilibrium outcome. What little systematic empirical evidence exists in support of the Paris Declaration agenda bears mostly on its harmonization provisions, not the alignment provisions that cover (inter alia) use of country systems. Anderson (2011 ), Djankov et al. (2009 , Knack and Rahman, 2007) and Knack and Smets (2012) all provide empirical evidence on the adverse effects of fragmenting a country"s aid among a larger number of donors. 2 Here we follow Easterly (2007) and Easterly and Pfutze (2008: 3-4) : "The academic aid policy literature and the aid agencies themselves agree on many elements of "best practice" . . . By taking this consensus as our standard, we are asking in effect if aid agencies operate the way they themselves say they should operate." are really providing "better" aid, in the absence of more evidence on how using country systems affects either the quality of systems or development outcomes.
The current study builds on the preliminary empirical tests reported in Knack and Eubank (2008) , using a much-expanded dataset. Unlike the earlier study, it addresses potential sample selection and endogeneity problems in detail. There is a time dimension to the dataset used in this study, allowing us to rule out omitted variable or simultaneity bias in certain key results. Before turning to the empirical analysis, the remainder of this section presents the theoretical arguments from Knack and Eubank (2009) in condensed form. To preview, a donor"s trust in a recipient"s aid management systems is determined in our framework by three broad considerations:
1. Confidence it will reap sufficient benefits from investing in recipient country systems;
2. Trustworthiness of those systems, as measured for example by corruption ratings; 3. Trust in aid"s effectiveness in general, in donor countries.
The Paris Declaration calls for increased use of recipient country systems in managing aid, but it explicitly acknowledges that the quality of country systems is a key determinant of their use by donors. Recipients, with technical assistance from donors, are therefore urged to strengthen their public financial management (PFM) systems. In the meantime, using those systems, despite their flaws, is believed to strengthen them in the medium or long run: "Donors can help build capacity and trust by using country systems to the fullest extent possible, while accepting and managing the risks involved…" (OECD, 2009a: 27) . On the other hand, bypassing country systems undermines them, by diffusing accountability and fragmenting policy and planning processes (OECD, 2009b; Mokoro Ltd. 2008a) . Moreover, donors often staff their own parallel aid management systems by "poaching" the most talented government officials.
Donors" incentives to trust country systems (or alternatively to micro-manage aid using their own parallel systems) depend in part on their perceived trustworthiness. Where recipient aid management systems are stronger, corruption scandals tarnishing the donor agency"s reputation are less likely to occur, and aid-funded programs are more likely to be selected and implemented more efficiently. The Paris Declaration recognizes that weaknesses in country systems sometimes justify donors" decisions to bypass them. The developmentally-optimal level of trust by donors in country systems varies positively with the quality of those systems. In certain cases, trust may even be inefficiently high (Jansen, 2009).
For a given level of trustworthiness of country systems, donors" trust in them can vary substantially because they have different mandates and face varying degrees of political pressure from their taxpayers and elected overseers. Multilateral donors can differ from bilateral donors, and some bilateral donors may be constrained more than others by limited support for foreign aid on the part of politicians and the public. Pressures to demonstrate visible achievements (that can be attributed plausibly to a donor agency"s own aid funds) to skeptical taxpayers or elected officials will increase further the tendency to free ride on other donors" contributions to strengthening country systems (Williamson and Agha, 2008: 34) . When bilateral donors use aid to advance diplomatic or commercial objectives, incentives to rely on their own parallel systems for aid delivery will be further aggravated. For example, using their own procurement rules will likely advantage donor-country contractors.
If using country systems for managing aid does strengthen them, then donors" use of country systems (in the absence of coordinated action) is likely to be sub-optimal. The benefits of using country systems are mostly external (benefiting other donors) and realized only over the long term, while costs are short term and fully internalized by the donor. When donor agency i undertakes any action to strengthen recipient country systems, it is in effect providing a public good for other donors. Stronger aid management systems reduce reputational and fiduciary risks and increase the developmental impact of aid funds not only for donor i "s future aid, but also for other donors. Meanwhile, donor i incurs the full costs, in exposing its current aid funds to higher risks than if it bypassed recipient country systems. The benefits are not wholly external, however: when a donor has a larger share of the aid "market" in a country, it will internalize more of the benefits from any investments in strengthening country systems. Donor i "s use of country systems is then expected to be positively related to its share of total aid that is received by a given country, controlling for quality of recipient systems.
The next section describes how the model"s concepts can be operationalized and its predictions tested using a panel dataset based on the Paris Declaration"s three monitoring surveys, with donor-recipient pairs as the main unit of analysis. Empirical results reported in section 3 are largely consistent with the predictions of the theoretical framework. A variety of robustness tests in this section address potential concerns regarding sample selection, omitted variables and endogeneity bias. The final section summarizes the findings and discusses their implications.
Data and Empirical Strategy

Measuring trust in country systems
We operationalize freedom from government corruption among its criteria. Political freedoms and civil liberties are correlated at .95, and we prefer the latter to the former to avoid conceptual overlap with Control of Corruption. 10 Anecdotal evidence from country evaluations suggests that donors sometimes bypass country systems because they are "slower and more cumbersome" as well as vulnerable to corruption (Wood et al., 2011) .
Use of country systems may be higher in more aid-dependent countries for two reasons.
First, delivering higher volumes of aid may be accomplished in part by disbursing a greater percentage of it in the form of direct budget support, which by definition uses country PFM systems. Second, the impact of donor decisions to use (or bypass) country systems on strengthening (or undermining) government capacity and accountability is likely to be greater where aid volumes are higher. These potential impacts may also be greater in lower-income countries, perhaps explaining in part why governments of many middle-income countries receiving modest levels of aid show relatively little concern over donors" choices of aid management practices (Wood et al., 2011) . The net effect of income on use of country systems is therefore ambiguous.
Donor characteristics comprise a third set of determinants of trust in country systems. A first-level distinction, between multilateral and bilateral (i.e. national) donors, reflects their differing mandates. Multilateral aid agencies were established in part to resolve collective action problems plaguing bilateral donors. They are better insulated from political pressures to demonstrate short-term visible results to elected officials and taxpayers (Wood et al., 2011) .
Multilaterals "are cases of joint delegation from multiple principals" that may "enable the agency to commit itself to procedures that would not be easy to implement for a bilateral donor, such as transparent and competitive procedures for tendering and procurement" (Martens et al., 2002: 21) . They also have a comparative advantage in aid activities involving "spillover effects"
which bilaterals "might have difficulty internalizing" (Martens et al., 2002: 65) . Donor coordination is part of the mandate of some multilaterals. The World Bank and UN partner with the OECD-DAC in its harmonization agenda and in the Paris Declaration monitoring effort. Use of country systems should therefore be greater in general for multilateral than for bilateral donors.
Among multilaterals, a further distinction can be made between the MDBs (multilateral development banks including the World Bank, IMF and regional development banks) and other multilateral donors including the UN system and European Commission (EC). The MDBs have a "country-led business model" that aims to align operations in support of recipient countries" national development strategies (World Bank, 2011) . The non-MDB multilaterals are a heterogeneous group, but for multiple reasons we expect their use of country systems to fall short of the MDBs". In the EC, "responsibility rests in the hands of serving politicians from member states," so its decisions are less apolitical than other multilateral agencies that "have genuinely delegated their management to an executive board" (Martens et al., 2002: 47) . National representatives in EC foreign aid decision-making committees devote considerable effort to pursuing opportunities for their own nation"s aid contractors (Martens et al., 2002: 193) . The various UN agencies are treated as a single donor in the PDMS, with their data collected and reported by the UNDP. 11 Some UN agencies specialize in humanitarian aid, which is not included in the PDMS. Other UN agencies provide mostly technical assistance, which rarely uses country PFM systems.
Among bilateral donors, the distinction between OECD-DAC donors and non-DAC donors may be important. 12 Use of country systems is expected to be higher for DAC donors, as the DAC is the leading advocate of Paris Declaration objectives including increased use of 11 Some bilaterals also have multiple aid agencies but the survey collects and reports data only at the national level, e.g. for the USA and not separately for USAID, the MCC, etc. 12 Non-DAC bilaterals in the sample include only Turkey and Korea. The latter is now a DAC member, but it was not during the 2005-2010 period covered by the surveys.
country PFM systems. The DAC"s peer reviews of its members" aid programs now include assessments of their consistency with Paris Declaration principles and objectives.
The DAC donors can be divided further, between the "Nordic Plus" group and others.
Nordic Plus donors include Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The group"s purpose is to improve complementarities among its members, through division of labor based on comparative advantages (NORAD, 2006; de Renzio, 2005) .
By reducing the number of sectors and countries each donor operates in, transactions costs for recipients can be reduced, at the price of reduced visibility for the donors. Nordic Plus membership can thus be viewed as a proxy for low skepticism of aid"s effectiveness among their domestic constituencies. Empirical support for this hypothesis may be interpreted as merely
showing that donors committed to the harmonization elements of the PD agenda tend to be committed also to its "alignment" elements. At a minimum, however, the Nordic Plus dummy can usefully test for any significant variation among DAC bilaterals in use of country systems.
The vertical funds (sometimes called global funds) comprise a last set of donors. These donors have limited sector-specific mandates, such as the environment or specific diseases. In the PDMS, most aid from vertical funds is accounted for by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. It disbursed 2.2% of the aid represented in the survey -more than the Netherlands or Canada. Vertical funds, particularly in health, are often viewed as being motivated by concerns over global public goods, not integrated into national strategies, and reluctant to use country systems (Wood et al. 2011: 34-35; World Bank, 2006: 22) . For these reasons vertical funds may be associated with lower use of country systems in general.
For the DAC bilateral donors, we can go beyond these donor group dummies and attempt to measure domestic constituents" trust in aid effectiveness in general using data from public opinion surveys. We expect stronger public support for development aid to increase a bilateral donor agency"s use of country systems. Where support for aid is relatively weak, aid agency officials will be under more pressure to show that the funds they are provided produce visible results directly attributable to its efforts, so will provide more aid in the form of projects using parallel systems and less in the form of budget support.
Data for testing this hypothesis are available from three different public opinion surveys: To maximize the information content from these three surveys and to preserve the sample size, we construct an index of public support for aid. Values from each survey are first standardized to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. Index scores, reported in Table 2, are then computed as the unweighted mean of the index components that are available for each country. The alpha coefficient of index reliability from this procedure is a very respectable .72, with an average inter-item correlation of .46. Most of our tests employ this index, but we also show how results are affected by instead using each of the three surveys in isolation.
Year dummies are also included in the regressions where appropriate. The Paris Declaration along with its associated monitoring indicators and follow-up conferences is designed in part to create "peer pressure" among donor agencies toward meeting its numerical targets. 13 If pressure from peers, recipients, or civil society is increased as intended, coefficients for year dummies included in the analysis should exhibit a significant positive trend.
Donors choose whether or not to use country systems. Their choices, however, reflect some combination of donor and recipient country characteristics. We estimate regressions of the general form: The dataset can be treated as an unbalanced panel, with anywhere between 1 and 80 observations per donor. We can exploit this structure of the data to conduct stronger tests by controlling for donor-year, recipient-year, or donor-recipient fixed effects. For example, in testing the robustness of results for Control of Corruption and other recipient characteristics, with the inclusion of donor-year fixed effects estimates are informed only by cross-recipient variation in the data within each of the 102 (= 34 x 3) donor-year panels. These regressions take the form
where t i Y X is a vector of donor-year fixed effects. The analysis similarly adopts a stringent and highly conservative approach to determining statistical significance of estimates. All tests, unless otherwise specified, correct standard errors for two-way clustering (Cameron, Gelbach and Miller, 2011) , for non-independence of errors within clusters of observations pertaining to each donor and to each recipient. Table 1 presents results from the baseline model, which includes observations from all 34 donors, by not including the public opinion variable that pertains only to bilaterals. Most coefficients have the hypothesized signs, and the majority of them are statistically significant at the .05 level. In countries where a donor has a larger share of the aid market, its aid is more likely to be managed via country PFM systems. The coefficient of .45
Results
Equation 1.1 of
indicates that for each 10 percentage point increase in the donor"s share of aid in a country, its use of country systems increases by 4.5 percentage points.
Control of Corruption and Civil Liberties also have positive and significant coefficients.
Control of Corruption is measured in standard deviation units, so use of country systems is nearly 9 points higher, other things equal, in a recipient scoring 1 standard deviation higher than another recipient. Each 10-point increment in the civil liberties index (scaled from 0 to 100) is associated with an increase in use of country PFM systems by 5.5 percentage points. Donors use country systems more in larger and more aid-dependent recipients. Neither per capita income nor the recent growth rate of income is significant.
The "donor type" dummies in general produce results consistent with expectations.
Relative to the omitted category of other DAC bilaterals, use of country systems is about 17 percentage points higher on average for the "Nordic Plus" group, and 15 points higher for the MDBs. Use of country systems is 15 percentage points lower for the non-DAC bilaterals 14 , and (somewhat surprisingly) 9 points higher on average for vertical funds, than for the omitted category. However, the latter difference falls far short of statistical significance at conventional levels. "Other multilaterals" do not differ from the reference group.
Coefficients for the year dummies are negative, indicating that use of country systems is Correcting for potential selection bias using the Heckman approach requires identifying exogenous variables that affect selection by recipients into the PDMS, and by donors and recipients into active aid relationships. Selection regressions are reported in Appendix Table A4 . The three remaining equations in Table A4 To test and correct for potential sample selection bias in our use of country systems regressions, we compute inverse Mills" ratios from equations A4.2-A4.4, allowing the impact of selection variables to vary by survey year (Wooldridge, 2002 to the predicted probability of selection, so its negative coefficient estimate in equation 1.4 implies that use of country systems is positively related to the selection probability. It is not significant at conventional levels, however, so there is only weak evidence of selection bias.
Moreover, the addition of the IMR to the model has little effect on results for key variables such as the donor"s share of aid. For simplicity, therefore, we do not correct for potential selection bias in reporting additional robustness tests in Tables 2 through 6. Note that these tests all include donor-year, recipient-year, or donor-recipient fixed effects, and the potential for selection bias is reduced (although not eliminated) in the presence of fixed effects (Wooldridge, 2002) . Table A4 , we assumed they had no direct effect on use of country systems.
However, donors might perceive a larger reputational stake in the development of their former colonies, and internalize more of the benefits of investments in strengthening their PFM systems.
The more intensive engagement of with donors, including relatively high levels of budget support, could imply increased use of country systems in HIPC countries, other things equal.
Neither the HIPC variables nor colonial ties are significant in equation 2.3, however, supporting their validity as selection variables in Table A4 If using country systems strengthens them while bypassing them weakens them (OECD, 2011; 2008a) , then quality of country systems is endogenous. We address this potential problem in several ways. First, any beneficial effects on quality from using PFM systems will be on the PFM systems themselves: budget execution, financial reporting, and auditing procedures. Our system quality indicators -Control of Corruption, supplemented by Civil Liberties -are defined far more broadly, and are likely affected only with a lag. Second, we lag the system quality indicators by a year in our tests. Third, we test for the presence of heterogeneous effects among donors that should be present -or absent -if coefficients on Control of Corruption are biased upward to a significant degree by reverse causation.
Our basic identification strategy is premised on differences among donors. First, we distinguish donors by size. The impact of a percentage point increase in a donor"s use of country systems should vary with a donor"s aid share. Each $1 increase should have the same impact, so 1 percentage point will imply a larger impact for larger donors. A sufficiently small donor could safely take system quality as given in its decisions. In contrast, there is no particular reason to expect the causal impact of quality of country systems on use of country systems to vary by donor size. Therefore, if coefficients on control of corruption in Tables 1 and 2 mostly reflect endogeneity bias, the strength of association should vary positively with donor size. We add the appropriate interaction term in equation 2.5 to test this hypothesis. 16 Results are highly inconsistent with the argument for reverse causation: the coefficient on the interaction term is negative (and significant at the .10 level for a two-tailed test), not positive.
In our second variant of this identification strategy, we distinguish donors by selectivity in aid allocations. Specifically, we posit that donors that are more sensitive to quality of country policies and systems when allocating aid will also be more sensitive to the quality of systems when deciding whether to rely on them for managing their aid. In contrast, there is no particular reason to expect the strength of any reverse causation from use of country systems to vary with donors" sensitivity to policy in allocating aid. An empirical finding of heterogeneous impacts in this instance can be explained better by the causal argument than by reverse causality (from use of systems to system quality). Equation 3.1 includes an interaction term, to test the hypothesis that Control of Corruption will affect use of country systems more for donors that are more policy selective in allocating aid among recipients. 17 For this purpose, we use the donor policy selectivity scores from Knack, Rogers and Eubank (2011), based on aid disbursements in 2007.
The interaction coefficient is positively signed, as hypothesized, and significant at the .05 level. 16 The interaction term is equal to the product of the deviations of Control of Corruption and donor aid share from their respective means. The coefficient on Control of Corruption thus indicates its marginal effect conditional on the mean value of donor aid share. 17 The interaction term is equal to the product of the deviations of Control of Corruption and policy selectivity from their respective means. The coefficient on Control of Corruption thus indicates its marginal effect conditional on the mean value of policy selectivity. The coefficient on policy selectivity is subsumed by the donor-year fixed effects, because it is donor-invariant.
Taken together, our measurement and identification strategies for estimating the impact of the quality of country systems do not entirely rule out endogeneity bias from our estimates.
However, these strategies coupled with empirical results from equations 2.5 and 3.1 suggest that the direction of causality is predominantly from quality to use of country systems.
Next, we address the possibility of omitted variable or endogeneity bias in the coefficient for donor aid share. Two potential objections are easily answered. First, the donor aid share coefficient is not merely showing that larger donors use country systems more. Tests in Tables 2   and 3 include donor-year fixed effects, so results imply that a given donor makes more use of country systems in those recipients where its share of aid is larger, as predicted. Second, higher quality country systems might induce donors both to increase their aid and to manage a larger share of it through country systems. If quality of systems is imperfectly measured by Control of Corruption and Civil Liberties, the donor aid share coefficient might appear to be affected by simultaneity bias. Donor aid shares will be unchanged, however, if all donors increase their aid proportionately, so this argument for bias is largely unfounded.
The simultaneity critique does apply if we allow donors" perceptions of corruption (or other aspects of the quality of country systems) to vary for a given recipient. Donors with relatively high risk perceptions may respond by reducing use of country systems and reducing aid -which will now reduce the aid share, because not all donors are reducing their aid. In equation 3.2 we control for risk perceptions that vary across donor-recipient pairs, by introducing donor-recipient fixed effects. Not incidentally, these pair dummies also control for effects of any historical, commercial or other ties that might increase a donor"s interest or reputational stake in a recipient"s long-run development. In this specification estimates are informed only by variation over time within each donor-recipient pair. This test is particularly stringent, as some regressors may exhibit little variation over the three periods, covering only a 5-year time span.
Nevertheless, most variables significant in previous tests remain significant in equation 3.2. The exception is Control of Corruption, which varies little over time for most recipients. The coefficient for donor aid share is somewhat lower in equation 3.2 than in tests using donor-year fixed effects, but it remains positive and significant at the .01 level.
We are not aware of any plausible argument regarding reverse causation from use of country systems to donor aid share. Nevertheless, the remainder of Table 3 funding formulas established by their membership. For these reasons, a donor"s aid share should be a better proxy for its reputational stake in a country"s development for bilaterals.
These arguments are supported in Table 3 . Equations 3.3 and 3.4 run the specification of equation 2.1 separately for bilateral and multilaterals, respectively. While donor aid share coefficients are positive and significant in both cases, the magnitude is three times as large for the bilaterals. Equation 3.5 retains the combined sample but introduces an interaction term, equal to the product of donor aid share and a multilateral dummy. The coefficient on this interaction is significant at the .05 level. We therefore instrument for public opinion in equation 6.3, with first-stage results shown in 19 The large negative USA coefficient reflects its relatively tepid support for some of the PD principles. Due to U.S. opposition the PD omitted targets for budget support, and weakened targets for use of country procurement systems (Mokoro Ltd., 2008b: 23) . In contrast, the U.S. led the effort to include a provision on "managing for results" in the PD because "reporting on results is critical to demonstrating aid effectiveness and to sustaining public and Congressional support for U.S. assistance" (USAID, 2006). However, USAID"s own reporting system "focuses mainly on physical deliverables" such as number of schools or clinics, instead of outcomes (OECD, 2006) . equation 6.4. The exclusion restriction assumes donor country size and number of former colonies predict support for aid but do not independently affect use of country PFM systems.
Citizens of smaller countries, or of countries with a more active history of colonization, may in general be better informed about poverty outside their own borders and feel a greater obligation to alleviate it (Paxton and Knack, 2011) . Total number of former colonies may be correlated with a dummy for whether each donor-recipient pair represents a former colonial relationship.
We thus control for a colonial tie dummy in the 2SLS test.
As 
Conclusions
This paper identifies and tests three broad explanations for donor agencies" inability or unwillingness to rely more on country systems. First, and most fundamentally, country systems are often not very trustworthy so their use implies significant reputational and fiduciary risks to donors. We provide empirical evidence supporting the proposition that use of country systems is strongly linked to their quality, as proxied by indicators of corruption perceptions and civil liberties. Knack and Eubank (2009) obtained a similar result using an indicator of PFM quality that is produced by World Bank staff.
Second, donors" trust in country systems is influenced by their mandates and by their constituents" faith in the development effectiveness of aid. Multilateral donors (particularly the development banks) use country systems more than bilaterals. There is substantial diversity within each category, however, and in bilaterals popular support for aid is associated with greater use of country systems. Where voters are more skeptical of aid, donors tend to micro-manage aid to produce tangible, visible outputs that can be plausibly attributed to its own activities.
Third, we find that a donor"s use of country systems is greater when it has a more "encompassing interest" in a recipient"s development. When a donor"s share of all aid provided to the recipient is higher, it internalizes more of the benefits of its use of country systems. These If donors" risk tolerance is mostly unaffected by the Paris Declaration campaign, broadbased and sizeable increases in the use of country systems may depend largely on improving their quality. However, successful reform of PFM systems tends to occur only over long time periods, and involves political as well as technical challenges, with resistance from certain public officials who benefit from maintaining less-transparent systems and procedures (OECD, 2009b; Allen, 2009; IEG, 2008) .
Concentrating a typical donor"s aid in fewer countries and sectors would reduce the enormous transactions costs imposed on recipient governments. It would also tend to increase donors" use of country systems, as the leading donors in a recipient would internalize a greater share of the benefits. Even if donors" aid shares were all unchanged in a country, but divisions of labor by sector were sharpened, donors would have less incentive to micro-manage aid. The lead donor for education, for example, would have a strengthened reputational stake in education outcomes, and similarly for the lead donor in health. Incentives for them would shift away from delivering donor-managed, successful-looking projects, and toward working with governments to deliver improved sector-wide development outcomes. Concentrating aid in fewer countries or sectors, however, potentially reduces a donor agency"s visibility, with possibly adverse consequences for its budget (see Andersen, 2000: 193) .
Of course, the urgency of pursuing such measures for the purposes of increasing use of country systems depends on learning more about the latter"s effects on development outcomes.
When donors choose to rely on country systems or bypass them, how important are the associated "learning-by-doing" externalities? While the Paris Declaration"s premise that the quality of aid matters as much as its quantity is surely correct, research on the implications of donor"s aid management practices for aid quality is still in its infancy. Further research using the PDMS data can test for the effects of different categories of aid -based on whether it is delivered in ways consistent with PD principles -on governance and other outcomes. < .0001 Dependent variable in columns 1-3 is percentage of donor aid to government managed by recipient government"s public financial management systems. Dependent variable in column 4 is index of public support for aid in donor country. T-statistics, reported in parentheses below point estimates, are based on standard errors adjusted for non-independence of errors within both donor and recipient clusters of observations in equations 1 and 2, and within donor-recipient pair clusters in equations 3 and 4, with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. -1.49 Gallup: Do you think that the wealthier nations should give more financial help to the poorer nations or are they giving enough now? (Should give more/are giving enough now) WVS: Some people favor, and others are against, having this country provide economic aid to poorer countries. Are you personally: very much for/for to some extent/somewhat against/very much against Eurobarometer: Do you think that the share of its budget that the [respondent"s country] Government dedicates to development aid is: too big/too small/about right 16 Dependent variable is selection, coded 1 for donor-recipient pairs if positive aid flows are recorded in the PDMS and 0 otherwise. Coefficients are marginal effects, evaluated at the means of all other independent variables. T-statistics, reported in parentheses below point estimates, are based on standard errors adjusted for non-independence of errors within recipient clusters of observations, with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
